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Social Security Reform in Uruguay: 
An Economic Assessment 
 
Olivia S. Mitchell 
 
 Driven by cost concerns and rapidly-aging populations, social security eform has emerged as a 
center-stage issue throughout Latin America in the last decade.  Some countries, such as Argentina and 
Peru, have followed Chile's example and added an individual-account pillar to their public retirement 
system.  Other nations, such as Brazil and Costa Rica, have sought to correct insolvency problems by 
streamlining benefits and doing a better job collecting taxes, while keeping a public pillar at the core of 
their national social insurance system.  
 Despite these efforts, a recent World Bank study (1994b) reports that old-age systems in Latin 
America (and elsewhere) are confronting alarming and rapidly growing deficits. Such deficits result from 
relatively generous benefits promised to a rapidly aging population, usually coupled with high payroll tax 
rates and widespread tax evasion.  As we will demonstrate below, the Uruguayan system is 
characterized by some of the problems common to other Latin nations, and in devising its own approach 
to reform, the nation has had to confront several of them.  Whether the Uruguayan reform law passed in 
1995 will be judged as successful in curtailing the social security system’s large and growing deficit is still 
in question. 
In this study we examine Uruguay’s social security system, exploring how it developed and what 
challenges it faces as the nation moves toward implementing its new social security reform law passed in 
August of 1995.  In the first section of this paper, we briefly highlight past problems and successes of the 
Uruguayan social security system, and outline socioeconomic challenges facing reformers in the 1990s.  
The next section characterizes salient features of the new law and examines how it might be expected to 
work in practice.  We then explore how the reformed system will influence the nation’s social security 
financing, market efficiency, and income distribution, drawing on lessons of social security reform in 
other nations.  We conclude with observations regarding positive developments and areas of concern, 
along with recommendations about topics deserving special attention in the near and longer term in 
Uruguay. 
I. Setting the Stage 
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The social security system in Uruguay is one of the oldest in Latin America, and as such has 
experienced many rounds of reform over the last century a d a half.   
A. The First 100 Years of Social Security Reform in Uruguay 
 The roots of today’s system are traced to a retirement program initially established for the 
military in 1830, followed by expansion of coverage to the rest of the workforce by 1942-3 (World Bank 
1988, 1993).  As the system evolved, it became more inclusive in terms of the risks covered, moving 
beyond retirement and survivors' benefits to include health insurance, work-related injuries, maternity 
protection, and then unemployment.  Also as the system evolved, it  grew more complex and more 
generous, with almost 50 separate individual funds (cajas) providing benefits to teachers, police, military, 
employees in risky occupations (e.g. miners), and public employees.   
 By the 1970s, over 80% of the Uruguayan labor force was covered by one or another of the 
several work-related retirement schemes. This coverage rate compares with a similar level in Argentina 
and Chile, and was substantially higher than many other Latin American countries: Mexico and Peru had 
about 40% coverage, and Paraguay around 20% (McGreevey 1990). Social security benefits in Uruguay  
were also easy to qualify for:  private sector workers were entitled to earnings-r lated benefits after only 
10 years of covered employment, and the national retirement age was among the lowest in the Western 
Hemisphere -- age 45 for women, 50 for men.  In addition, low wage-earn rs were eligible for a public 
assistance pension, so that virtually the entire workforce could be considered covered by some form of 
social security without terribly stringent work or contribution requirements.  On the whole, the first century 
of social security in Uruguay produced a system more generous and that covered more people than in 
most of the rest of Latin America. 
  High retirement benefits and widespread coverage began to push system outlays up to, and 
over, system revenues, inducing Uruguayan politicians to seek reforms more than once. A far-reaching 
restructuring of the system occurred in 1979, bringing along with it centralized administration of many 
(though not all) cajas under one roof.  A General Directorate of Social Security (DGSS) was created with 
oversight for the health and family allowances programs, maternity benefits, the unemployment program, 
and the retirement fund covering civil servants, teachers, and industry/commerce workers.  At the same 
time, the normal retirement age was raised to 60 for men and 55 for women at 30 years of service; this 
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was more stringent than Argentina's and Venezu la's 60/55+15 formula in effect at the time, but less 
stringent than in Chile which had a 65/60+15 requirement  (McGreevey, 1993:61).  Benefits were set at 
70% of average final pay after 35 years of service, where final pay was initially averaged over 6 years, 
subsequently reduced to 3 years.  But once again, early retirement benefits worth 60% of pay were made 
available to men with fewer than 35 years of work history (and women with fewer than 30 years).  
Survivors received between 66 and 75% of the deceased retiree's benefit amounts, and special benefits 
were also payable to divorcees and parents of deceased pensioners.  All retirees attaining age 70 with a 
minimum of 10 years of service were entitled to extreme old age benefits, worth 85% of the minimum 
wage; the extreme old-age cutoff was subsequently dropped to 65.  Finally, special groups such as 
teachers were entitled to additional credit for service years, and other groups were exempted from the 
higher service and retirement age rules. 
 Periodic efforts to make benefits more uniform were accompanied by reductions in social 
security payroll taxes.  For example the (total) payroll tax rate for industry/commerce workers totaled 36-
7% in 1969, subsequently lowered to 25% by 1985 (World Bank 1988).   Additionally the government 
eliminated earmarked taxes to cover family allowances and unemployment insurance.  Nevertheless 
evasion of the payroll tax continued, with one estimate in the mid-1980's reaching 27% (World Bank 
1988).  Additionally, the social security reform of 1979 permitted many older workers to opt for early 
retirement during a lengthy transition period, thus avoiding the higher retirement hurdles required under 
the new rules.  
B. Social Security in Uruguay over the Last Decade 
 The combination of reduced payroll tax revenues, earlier retirement, and lengthening life 
expectancies in Uruguay took a toll on the system’s finances, which grew more desperate throughout the 
1980s.  Because the payroll tax was insufficient to cover benefit outlays, additional revenue from the 
value-added tax (IVA) was required for the system to stay solvent.  As a consequence, the  IVA was 
boosted several times, with the minimum IVA rate growing from 7% in 1979 to 12% in 1984, and the 
basic rate rising from 18 to 20% over th  same period.  By the mid-1980s, expenditures for social 
security in Uruguay had ballooned to around 10% of GDP -- comparable to that in Argentina and Chile, 
but more than double that in Brazil (5%) and Mexico (3%) [See Table 1].  In addition, outlays exceeded 
  
 
4 
 
 
 
system revenues in Uruguay by a substantial margin -- 60% (or about 3 percentage points of GDP) -- 
making it the most deficit-ridden system in Latin America (Mesa Lago 1990; World Bank 1988).   
 Uruguayan social security system shortfalls contributed to the overall government deficit, and 
were also accused of depressing national economic growth and causing macroeconomic problems 
including inflation.  In addition the system was charged with inequities, inasmuch the plans for certain 
privileged groups (i.e. public employees and teachers) often operated in the red, whereas the 
industry/commerce fund produced a surplus in most years.  Benefits were also seen as unevenly 
allocated for given age/service combinations, particularly among teachers, public sector workers, and the 
military.   
 A follow-on wave of reforms in 1987-  met only partial success. A ceiling was set on maximum 
pensions, but efforts to raise the retirement age from 55/60 (women/men) to 60/65 were defeated (IADB 
1991).  Coverage of the system near the end of the 1980s declined to about 75% of the labor force, 
partly because workers and their employers colluded to evade the rising payroll tax which, by 1988, had 
grown to 37.5% (16% for employees, 21.5% for employers). Since lower contributions did not reduce 
eventual benefits paid, social security tax evasion was substantial, at 3% of GDP (IVA evasion stood at 
about 1.8% of GDP). By the end of the 1980s, Uruguay was believed to have the highest labor costs of 
the MERCOSUR nations, and had the lowest ratio of contributors to pensioners -- one-to-one -- in all of 
Latin America (World Bank 1993).   
 Further retarding the system’s progress toward solvency, a referendum of the Uruguayan people 
in 1989 overwhelmingly repealed the ceiling on social security pensions set just two years prior, and 
required that all pensions be linked to the cost of living index (World Bank 1993:52).  In 1992 the 
government again tried to institute reform but was voted down by Congress, despite the fact that it left 
untouched retirement ages and payroll tax rates.  The major changes embedded in that proposal were to 
require 10 years of service as a requirement for regular retirement benefits, and benefit formulas were 
shaved somewhat, from 70% down to 60% of contributions plus 0.5% per year of service up to a total of 
65% (World Bank 1993).  Under this proposal, the government would offer a minimum pension, equal to 
the minimum wage, and would pay survivor and disability benefits.  In addition very old age benefits 
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would be continued for the destitute with no other pension. Finally, the government proposed a 
mandatory second pillar individual pension that would earn a guaranteed real rate of 3.5%.   
 That bill was defeated, leaving the country in 1994 facing prospects of social security meltdown.  
System expenditures totaled 13% of GDP and were projected to continue growing, social security 
participation had continued to fall to 69%, evasion was estimated at one-third f potential revenues, 
payroll and IVA taxes were unsustainably high, real benefit levels had risen 50% in the previous four 
years, and almost one-fifth of the population qualified for a pension (IMF 1995:1).  No wonder, then, that 
a substantially revised and elaborated version of this defeated bill was revived and f nally passed in 
August of 1995. 
II. The 1995 Reform Law: Key Elements and Questions 
 In August of 1995, the Uruguayan Legislature approved a bill to overhaul the nation’s Social 
Security system.1  In this section we first review the reform, and the turn to a discussion of the new 
system’s financing and benefit formulas.  In addition we examine the system’s administration, and note 
several outstanding questions about the structure of the new agencies designed to administer the law.  In 
the subsequent section we discuss potential impacts of the new system. 
A.  Overview of the Reform 
 The 1995 reform as legislated institutes a mandatory national system for paying regular 
retirement benefits, survivors’ benefits, extreme old age benefits, and disability benefits in Uruguay.  In 
this way it continues the general types of commitments made by the prior system. All Uruguayan 
nationals (and foreigners resident in the country for at least 15 years) are eligible to participate in social 
security. System financig derives from payroll taxes paid by employers and employees, additional 
revenues as needed from the IVA, and in some cases, voluntary additional contributions.  Payroll taxes 
are to be collected in collaboration with the Direccion General Impositivo (DGI) and turned over to the 
Banco de Prevision Social (BPS), which is the national social security administrator. Funds are then 
transferred from the BPS to new Associaciones de Fondos de Ahorro Previsional (AFAPs), which will 
invest the money, purchase retirement and supplemental benefits, and conduct reporting and disclosure 
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tasks.  The institution of the AFAPs is newly constituted with this bill, and many aspects of this new 
institution remain to be fully spelled out as yet. 
 Benefits are payable under two pillars in the new Uruguayan system, a welfare or “solidarity” 
pillar, and a mandated individual pension pillar.  The first pillar resembles the basic benefit payable 
under the previous social security system, though conditions for retiring have been made somewhat 
more stringent and the replacement rate has been decreased somewhat.  The first pillar provides a 
retirement annuity that depends on the retiree’s age, years of covered employment, and covered 
earnings; the rules specify both a minimum and a maximum benefit.  The second pillar is a new 
development, relying on a mandatory individual pension contributions invested by an AFAP on the 
worker’s behalf.  At retirement, insurance companies are to provide both first- and second-pillar annuities 
based on tax revenues (for the first pillar) and capital accumulation (for the second pillar). In addition, the 
insurance companies are to provide supplementary benefits for the totally disabled, the very old, and for 
survivors; the government will maintain direct responsibility for partial disability benefits.   
 Pursuant to the August 1995 law, the Uruguayan government has worked to develop the 
regulations under which the new AFAPs will work, including the role of a public AFAP operated by the 
social security bank (BPS) and the structure of a government-guaranteed minimum real rate of return on 
AFAP investments.  In addition, regulations regarding the insurance industry will probably have to be 
clarified as well.  Finally, it appears [Art 12] that all nominal amounts in the law are indexed, thus keeping 
contribution and benefit thresholds constant in real terms.2   
B. Financing Issues Under the Reform 
 By financing we refer to the mechanisms used to pay for the program benefits and 
administration.  Several different sources of revenue are contemplated.  
Employer and Employee Contributions:  
 Under the new law, employer contributions will decline by 2 percentage points of payroll from 
14.5% to 12.5% of base income, and employee contributions will rise from 13% to 15% forhe bulk f 
                                                                                                                                            
1 The Uruguayan social security system continues to offer programs covering medical care, family  
benefits, and unemployment insurance, as before; however only the old-age system is the main 
focus of the 1995 reform, and hence of this paper. 
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the population (in the industry and commerce sector; in manufacturing the employer rate will be set at 
6% for a time) [Art 181-183].  Base income is deemed to be earnings up to UR$5,000 per month (or 
US$728 in 1995; all figures are indexed).3  The overall combined payroll tax rate is therefore on the 
order or 27.5%, unchanged from the combined tax in effect prior to the reform.  (Payroll tax rates do 
continue to vary by sector and higher rates, up to double, will continue to apply to teachers and thos  in 
risky occupations).  In exchange for the employer-side payroll tax cut, employers are required to raise 
employee pay so their take-home earnings after social security taxes will remain the same as before. 
Employees so desiring may make additional voluntary contributions to the national social security system 
as well [Art 7]. 
 Revenue generated by these payroll taxes is to be used in two different ways.  One portion will 
pay for the first pillar or “solidarity” benefits, and the remainder is to be deposited to the funded individual 
mandatory savings pillar.  How these allocations are made depends on the covered employee’s salary, 
and to some extent the employee’s choice [Art 7, 8, 14]:   
 ·Covered workers with earnings below UR$5,000 per month may elect to deposit up to half of 
their own share of the payroll tax into the AFAP system (i.e. 7.5% up to UR$5,000), with the remainder of 
their taxable amount plus the entire employer portion being deposited into the first pillar.  
 ·Covered workers with monthly earnings between UR$5,000-15,000 must put half of their own 
contribution (7.5% up to $5,000) and the full employer-side tax on all earnings into the first-pillar plan [Art 
14].  The remaining employee contributions must flow into the AFAP system (i.e., 7.5% on earnings to 
$5,000, and 15% on earnings between UR$5,000 and $15,000).4  
 ·Covered workers earning over UR$15,000 per month must contribute as do lower earners for 
pay up to $15,000; on earnings over UR$15,000, they may voluntarily opt to pay additional contributions 
to the AFAP system. 
Additional Revenues: 
                                                                                                                                            
2 All references identified as [Art. x] refer to the article number of the 1995 Uruguayan social 
security reform law; see Republica Oriental del Uruguay (1995). 
3 Some 80% of the working population earned less than that amount in 1995 (Ayala 1995). 
4 UR$15,000 was about US$2,500 in mid-1995. 
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 Employer and employee payroll taxes are to be allocated by the BPS to Administradores de 
Fondos de Ahorro Previsional (AFAPs), along with additional IVA revenues as required, sufficient to 
cover the first pillar as well as supplementary benefits.  In addition to taxes, the system is to be financed 
by investment returns within the AFAPs.  Benefits paid under the second pillar will depend on investment 
performance, though the state has guaranteed a minimum real 2% rate of return on all AFAP portfolios 
[Art 139].  How this guarantee will be funded has not yet been outlined in detail  in the 1995 law. 
 
C. Benefit Computations Under the Reform 
 Retirement benefits payable under the new system are to be of two types. The first pillar benefit 
depends on pay and service, subject to both a minimum and maximum level. (Those in risky jobs, and 
teachers, are covered under a more generous benefit formula than the average).  Some retirees will also 
receive a second-pillar benefit, namely those lower-paid workers who opted to devote half their payroll 
tax to the AFAP system, higher paid workers who were required to put half of their payroll tax (to $5K) 
into the AFAP system, and anyone who earned over UR$15,000 who made additional voluntary 
contributions to that system. 
 Eligibility for both first and second pillar regular retirement benefits depends on the worker’s 
retirement age and number of years of covered employment in the system.  The minimum retirement 
age for women will be raised to equal that currently applying to men (60) and women will also be 
required to complete 35 years of service (as do men), after a transition period occurring over the next 
decade. Delayed retirement beyond age 60 is recognized by benefit increases in the basic benefit 
formula;  AFAP benefits can received at age 65 irrespective of the participant’s employment status. 
First Pillar Benefits: 
 The regular retirement benefit under the first pillar is determined by computing the retiring 
worker’s base salary, and then applying a percentage benefit formula to this number.  Base salary 
(sueldo basico jubilatorio - Art 27) includes the worker’s pay in covered employment -- employment for 
which social security contributions were made (and demonstrated to the BPS’ satisfaction). Base salary 
is computed as the maximum of: 
 (i) the average of the last 10 years’ pay, capped at $5,000; or  
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 (ii) the average of the best 20 years’ pay capped at $5,000, where each year’s indexed pay 
 cannot exceed the prior year’s by more than 5% [Art 27].  
 In other words, the first-pillar benefit formula provides no return for pay in any year above 
$5,000, despite the fact that employer and employee payroll taxes are levied on salaries above that 
level. This provides little incentive to report earnings over that level from the perspective of the first 
pillar, though the second pillar plan (described below) somewhat reduces incentives for evasion. 
 Certain nonwage benefits provided by employers are to be excluded from base salary 
computations (e.g. life, dental, and medical insurance premiums up to 20% of the worker’s pay - Art 
167), and special rules are developed for the self- mployed as well as workers in construction and 
transport [Art 169, 172].    
 At age 60, a retiring worker with at least 35 years of covered employment will be eligible for a 
first pillar regular retirement benefit of 50% of base salary, down from 60% under the old law.  In addition 
a worker delaying retirement receives an additional 0.5% credit for years over 35, and 3% for each year 
over age 60 to a maximum of 80%. The specific formula is given as follows [Art 29]: 
 Regular retirement first pillar benefit      (Eq.1) 
    = 50% Base salary 
     AND if have over 35 years service 
     + Min[2.5%, 0.5%*(Years - 35) ] 
     AND if over age 60 
     + Min[30%, 3%*(Age - 60)]. 
 It should be noted that the 0.5% per year additional per year of service also applied under the old 
plan, and so what is new is the lower initial benefit (50% of base salary instead of 60%), plus the 3% 
increment for delayed retirement per year after age 60.  Because this 3% increment is still not actuarially 
fair (a neutral increment would probably be around 7% per year of age), it remains the case that working 
an additional year beyond age 60 reduces the net present value of one’s social security benefits.  As a 
consequence the new formula provides no net positive incentives to delay retirement after age 60 given 
35 years of service, though the disincentive effect is smaller than under the old law.   
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 The new law also contains a minimum benefit formula which offers somewhat more of a positive 
incentive to delay retirement.  Anyone leaving work with a history of low earnings will receive a flat $550 
per month, with benefits increased by 12% per year after age 60 (for a maximum of 10 years).  The 
specific formula is as follows: 
 Minimum regular first pillar benefit      (Eq. 2) 
    = $550/mo 
    AND if over age 60 
    * Min [120%, 12%(age - 60)] 
 The existence of the minimum benefit may induce system noncompliance for low-paid workers 
and their employers, who could jointly collude to contribute the minimum needed while still generating a 
first-pillar minimum benefit payment. 
  Finally the new law specifies a maximum benefit payable under the system which is indexed 
along with all other nominal values, as follows: 
 Maximum regular first pillar benefit     (Eq. 3) 
    =$4125/mo 
 One issue of considerable interest is how base salary will be computed for those who chose to 
contribute to the AFAP instead of the “solidarity” pillar. As explained earlier, a low-wage employee is 
permitted to deposit up to half of his share of the payroll tax into the AFAP, and higher-paid employees 
must deposit a portion of the tax into the AFAP.   The law specifie  that in the former case, the base 
salary to be used for the retiree’s first pillar benefit purpose is equal to 1.5 times the pay on which first-
pillar contributions were made.   
 As an illustrative example, consider a worker whose average indexed final salary was UR$4,000 
and he had opted to split his payroll tax between the AFAP and the first pillar program.  Assuming 35 
years of service at age 60, at retirement the first pillar benefit would be equal to $1,500,  computed by 
taking half his pay (UR$2000) multiplied by 1.5 and taking half the result (i.e. 1.5 * .5 * $4,000=$1,500).  
On top of this amount, the AFAP benefit would be equal to the annuity value of his contributions (i.e. 
7.5% of $2,000 per year) incremented by investment earnings.  With a 35-year work career, a real 
interest rate of 2% (the government guaranteed rate), and a life expectancy of 18 years from age 60, the 
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monthly AFAP annuity would be around $400 per month.5  I  total, the hypothetical retiree’s benefit 
under the two-pillar aproach would sum to around UR$2,000, approximately the same benefit payable 
to an identical worker who had left his entire contribution in the first-pillar program and opted out of the 
AFAP.  A different way to put this is that unless real rates of return p oved to be substantially in excess 
of 2% real, the second-pillar plan will be unlikely to attract optional contributions of many Uruguayans 
earning less than $5,000 per year.  As a result, relatively low opting-in rates to the AFAP system would 
be expected in Uruguay under current rules. 
 An individual working beyond age 60 is entitled to a delayed retirement increment in the basic 
pension [Art 29] which once again offers less than an actuarially neutral pay increase (2% per year after 
age 70).  The basic formula, given below, may be affected by special minima and maxima [Art 40, 41, 
75, 76]: 
 Delayed retirement benefit         
(Eq. 4)   = Regular benefit 
    + Min [20%, 2%*(Age - 70)] 
 In sum, the new two-pillar system is not particularly simple, given the multiple contribution 
options, as well as the many different regular and delayed benefit formulas (including complex 
minimums and maximums that change with age and service).  Furthermore, it is far from clear how 
workers with “typical” earnings streams will fare in retirement  -- even without considering the AFAP 
performance.   
 To understand this point, note that the summary of the first-pillar plan changes in Table 2 shows 
that both men and women employees retiring at 60 years of age with 35-40 years of service would be 
anticipated to experience a  decline in their replacement rate under the new system as compared to the 
old program.  Somewhat unexpectedly, however, the reform affects people delaying retirement to 70  
years of age differently by sex.  That is, men will experience an increase in their replacement rate at the 
later retirement age, while women will face about a 10% cut in theirs.  Such anomalies would be even 
more likely if one took into account the minimum and maximum pensions plus supplementary b nefits, 
about which more is said below.   
                                            
5 Communication from Hector Salazar (IADB), November 1995. 
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Second Pillar Benefits: 
 Persons with accumulations in an AFAP are subject to the same requirements for retirement as 
under the first pillar -- namely, workers of both sexes must be at least age 60 and have at least 35 years 
of covered employment. Accumulations at retirement will depend on the individual’s contributions over 
the worklife plus  investment earnings, minus annual commissions which are to be set by the AFAPs 
individually [Art. 99-102].  By law, real returns on investments in the AFAPs may not fall below 2% per 
year, and an individual AFAP may not earn less than 2% below the average of all AFAPs (or it will be 
liquidated by the government; Art 97-99). Participants may change their AFAP up to twicea year, and 
must hold all individual account accumulations in only one AFAP at a time -- lso the case in Chile [Art. 
106-109].  No AFAP may refuse to service any participant, a feature that may cut down on adverse 
selection problems experienced in other insurance contexts. 
 At retirement, a participant must use AFAP accumulations to purchase an annuity from an 
insurance company.  The annuity benefit which will depend on the accumulation amount as well as on 
the retiree’s age, life tables, and assumed rates of r turn [Art 127].  The law contains no discussion of 
what annuity tables are to be used, and whether an insurance company can turn down prospective 
annuitants or charge differential prices (e.g. by sex, income level).  It would be useful to clarify several 
insurance issues in subsequent regulations, similar to those raised in Argentina when that nation 
instituted a similar capitalization regime (World Bank 1994a). 
Supplementary Benefits: 
 In addition to the regular retirement benefits just described, the r formed public social security 
system continues to offer supplementary benefit payments to those who meet certain categories of need 
or eligibility. These “categorically needy” groups include the disabled, survivors, those attaining extreme 
old age with no other benefits, and those needing funeral expense coverage. Eligibility for each of these 
varies by benefit type, but fewer years of service and younger ages (if any) are required than for the 
regular benefit.   
 In general, these supplementary benefit payments depend on the employees’ pay in covered 
employment, either directly or via the pension formula which in turn depends on covered salary [Art 25, 
29, 30, 32, 59].  In this way, the payments in Uruguay have been delinked from the nationally set 
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“minimum wage”, which some see as an important cost-saving mechanism inasmuch as the national 
minimum wage is subject to political pressure to change.  Also benefit levels have been reduced under 
the new law: extreme old-age benefits are payable at age 70 with 15 years of service instead of 65/10 
previously required under the old system. Under the old law, the extreme old age benefit was 85% of the 
minimum wage, whereas under the new law the formula has been cut to 50% of base salary plus 
supplements as follows: 
 Very old age benefit = 50% of Base salary (defined above)  
     AND if have years over 15 
     + Min[14%, 1%*(Years service - 15)].   
 Partial disability benefits are payable for a work-related injury or accident with no length of 
service requirement, or for other disabilities after only 2 years of covered employment (as long as the 
past six months were in covered employment). Partial and total disability benefit levels are scheduled as 
follows (IMF 1994):  
 Total disability = 45% of Base salary 
 Partial disability = 65% of Base salary 
 The minimum disability pension under the new law is higher (UR$950) than the minimum old-age 
pension ($550), which suggests greater potential for low-wage workers in moderate to fair health to seek 
the disability pension in the future.  Finally,  survivors’ benefits will apparently be a function of the 
covered person’s pension eligibility and will also be means tested, as a function of the survivor’s age and 
income: 
 Widows/ers/divorced benefit for those > age 40  
    = 66-75% of covered worker’s pension benefit 
    (depending on whether she has minor children). 
 The very old age pension is payable for life as is the total disability pension, whereas the partial 
disability benefit is payable for a maximum of 3 years [Art 22] and the survivor benefit for those younger 
than age 40 is subject to means testing under the new law [Art 25].  Exactly how the means test is to be 
applied is not described in any detail in the present law, but substantial administrative costs would be 
anticipated in setting up and maintaining the effort associated with such monitoring.   
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 It appears to be the plan to have the AFAPs accumulate sufficient monies so that they can 
purchase insurance annuities from insurance companies, sufficient to pay regular (fi st pillar) retirement 
benefits, very old age benefits, total disability benefits, and survivor benefits [Art 127-8]. Since payroll 
taxes are not expected to produce all the needed funds, presumably VAT taxes will have to make up the 
difference but the mechanism is not clear. Unless this is clarified, there is a risk that the AFAPs will soon 
run out of funds to pay the first and supplemental pillars, perhaps jeopardizing the retirement funds in the 
second pillar of the AFAPs.  
 
D. System Administration Under the Reform 
 Under the new reform bill, social security in Uruguay is to be provided by a mixed public-private 
system. Payroll taxes will continue to be collected by the government, but capital accumulation and most 
benefit payments will be handled by newly created private pension funds and existing insurance 
companies.  Only one of the supplementary benefits, partial disability insurance, remains completely 
under the control of the BPS. 
The Role of the BPS:  
 At the government level, the new social security system is to be administered by both new and 
existing state institutions.  The tax collection agency, the Direccion General Impositivo (DGI), will collect 
payroll taxes and turn them over to the Banco de Prevision Social (BPS), which was the national social 
security administrator under prior law. 
 New responsibilities are also envisaged for the BPS.  This agency will now be charged with 
developing and maintaining employment histories for system participants, which will require that 
employees having contributed into the social security system in the past produce proof of contributions 
satisfactory to the BPS.  This must be done within a relatively short period of time and with more 
concrete documentation than has apparently been true in the past.  In addition the BPS must oversee 
employer compliance with the payroll tax, and may levy fines in the event of nonpayment.  There is also 
a plan to increase administrative efficiency of the BPS, inasmuch as administration costs currently 
amount to 6% of benefit payments annually (Gomez-Fabling 1995).   
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 While streamlining the BPS would undoubtedly be useful and increase the system’s efficiency, 
the data in Table 3 indicate that Uruguayan social security administrative costs are not especially high, at 
least compared to many other Latin American nations; Brazil and Chile both report cost ratios of 7-8%, 
and the LAC average is close to 28%.  Since social security administrative cost rates in the OECD 
nations average an order of magnitude less (3%), some see this as a target worth emulating.  On the 
other hand, it must be recognized that administrative costs might rise if services offered by the system 
were enhanced substantially. 
 
 
The Role of the AFAPs:   
 Under the new social security system, the BPS will forward payroll tax revenue (and probably 
additional VAT revenue as needed) to the AFAPs.  It will be the AFAPs responsibility to invest the funds, 
purchase retirement and supplemental benefit annuities, and conduct reporting and disclosure tasks.  
The BPS must also establish the first AFAP, described as a private independent financial institution to 
administer individual contributions under the second pillar of the system [Art 81]. Additional AFAPs may 
subsequently be established, including by banks, and must initially hold a minimum capital reserve of 
$60K, with 2%  of fund value thereafter (or they face dissolution by the Central Bank).  In addition a 
Fluctuation Fund must be held to cover variations in returns. AFAPs may charge commissions with rates 
freely set subject to the proviso that all affiliates are charged the same, and rates must be the same for 
both mandatory and voluntary contributions.  In this way, the commission structure proposed resembled 
that adopted by Chilean AFPs, though recent reforms have loosened the Chilean restrictions on 
investment substantially (Kandell 1995). 
 Probably to try to reduce the opportunities for fraud, Uruguay has directed that the AFAPs will 
face strict investment requirements over pension fund assets [Art 133]: 
 A) Initially 100% in government bonds, falling by 5-10% per year to a minimum of 60%; 
 B) Maximum of 30% in bank bills from the Banco Hipotecario; 
 C) Maximum of 30% in cash or currency; 
 D) Maximum of 25% in Uruguayan corporate or public stock; 
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 E) Maximum of 25% in direct Uruguayan investments with financial guarantees; 
 F) Maximum of 15% in loans of up to 2 years duration with a minimum ROR. 
 Further rules limit the sum of holdings under items B through F to less than 20% in year 1, rising 
by 5-10% per year to a maximum of 70% thereafter; also items C+E cannot exceed 15%, and items 
D+E+F cannot exceed 30%.  Finally, several types of investments are prohibited [Art 124] including 
foreign investments (except for financial institutions operating in Uruguay), insurance company paper, 
paper issued by AFAPs, and paper issued by investment companies.  Such limits on AFAP investments 
will severely restrict the institutions’ ability to compete on performance, and should soon be relaxed in 
favor of more diversified holdings over Latin America and elsewhere.    
The Role of the Central Bank:  
 The Central Bank is to control the overall structure of the AFAPs including the Fluctuation Fund 
mentioned above.  Should an AFAP’s system’s reserves fall below the above-mentioned thresholds, the 
Central Bank may liquidate the noncomplying AFAP.  The Central Bank will also oversee contracts 
between the AFAPs and insurers, and publish information periodically about the system.   
Other Roles of the State:  
 Under the new social security law, the Uruguayan government has also taken on several new 
risk-sharing obligations which thus far have not been fully discussed nor financed in full.  For example, 
the law specifies that the state will guarantee a minimum real rate of return on AFAP portfolios, and 
further guarantees first pillar and supplementary benefits in the event of an insurance company 
bankruptcy [Art 139]. In addition, benefit payments are guaranteed for government-run AFAPs (though 
not for the private AFAPs, which may make it difficult for the latter to compete). How these risk-sharing 
arrangements are to be structured has not been detailed as yet. The state is also authorized to issue 
indexed bonds with a minimum real rate of return, which only the AFAPs will be permitted to hold.  How 
this process is to work has not been fully spelled out.  Finally, the state has responsibility for financial and 
insurance market regulation, though exactly how this will evolve is not explicitly discussed in this bill. 
III. An Assessment of the Uruguayan Social Security System Reform 
 In this section we explore in more detail particular results expected from the Uruguayan social 
security reform, focusing on potential fiscal, distributive, and efficiency outcomes.  Where possible we 
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draw lessons from other Latin American nations undergoing social security restructuring over the recent 
past. 
A. Fiscal Implications of the Reform 
 There is little question but that the old Uruguayan social security system faced mounting deficits 
into the foreseeable future, mainly due to the aging of the population, increasing benefits over time, and 
rising evasion (BID 1995; Kane 1995; IADB 1996; World Bank 1988, 1993;). As is evident in Table 4, 
Uruguay’s population was older, and was aging more rapidly, than other nations in L tin America and the 
Caribbean, with 23% of the population expected to be age 60 or older by 2030 (versus 19% in Argentina, 
21% in Chile, and 16% in the LAC region as a whole).   
 How deep these problems were, and whether the new system will succeedin all viating the 
system’s insolvency problems, remains to be seen. For example an IMF analysis projected “old law” BPS 
outlays at 14.8% of GDP in 1995, rising to 15% in 2005, and to 16.8% by 2035 if no reforms were 
undertaken (IMF 1995).  Payroll taxes w re expected to fall ever behind rising benefit payments, 
necessitating an infusion of general revenues equivalent to 8.6% of GDP by 2035.6 A different forecast 
(Ayala 1995) found that without the reform, payroll tax rates would have had to grow to 44% of pay in 
1999, 38% in 2009, and 50% by 2039 to achieve solvency without additional IVA contributions.     
 Early efforts to predict the fiscal implications of the reform concluded that the new system will 
not be able to be supported from payroll taxes alone in the short and medium runs, but rather value-
added taxes must continue to be used to sustain the system. According t the IMF, social security 
expenditures under the new rules were projected to decline over the next decade by three full points of 
GDP, and by 2035 by almost seven points (to 10% of GDP instead of almost 17%; see Table 5).  In this 
simulation tax evasion was projected to decline by about one-third, raising revenue.  Pulling in the 
opposite direction, first-pillar revenues would be predicted to fall by an estimated 0.75% of GDP since a 
portion of the payroll tax would now go to the individual pension pillar.  Overall, net payroll tax revenue 
to the public pillar was expected to fall 0.2% beginning around 2010.  As a result, most of the cost-
savings under the new system would accrue to the Treasury, whose burden would drop from 6.5% of 
                                            
6 A somewhat smaller deficit is projected by Gustavo Michelin (1995) based on smaller projected 
increases in future benefits. 
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GDP down to 4% a decade later, then 3%, and finally 1% in 2035.  Of course these projections depend 
on several assumptions holding true (such as real wage growth rising and evasion declining), which may 
or may not actually occur. A different report cites BPS estimates indicating that the new rules would pare 
demands on revenues somewhat, but payroll taxes would have to be 27% through 2030 to balance the 
system without IVA support, and would need to be higher thereafter that point (Ayala 1995).   
 Either way, the aging of the Uruguayan population and the high level of benefits promised under 
the new regime still entails a public pension system projected at around 7.4%% of GDP by 2035.   Some 
would judge this level of government expenditure to be too high to be sustainable, though it is certainly 
than comparable countries such as Argentina (spending 6% of GDP on social security) and less than 
Chile’s expenditures of 13% of GDP on social security (see Table 1). 
 It should be noted that other countries have suffered from evasion problems when their social security 
payroll taxes were high.  For example, in Argentina, payroll tax evasion was estimated at 40% given total 
payroll taxes of 27%, and even in Chile there appears to be substantial nonparticipation by low-paid 
workers because they can do better under the minimum guaranteed public benefit than by paying into the 
Chilean private pillar (Mesa Lago 1993; World Bank 1994a; Salvador Valdes Prieto 1992, 1993, 1994). 
Clearly one factor producing evasion is high payroll tax rates, and the Uruguayan reform has not 
curtailed the overall rate of payroll taxes. The data in Table 3 show Uruguay’s total tax rate is about 3 
times the LAC average of 10.5% per worker per year. A second factor likely to induce evasion is the 
delinking of benefits and taxes paid, and unfortunately it appears that the necessary links have not been 
forged with the reform plan in Uruguay.  That is, very low-paid orkers will tend to receive the minimum 
benefit irrespective of contributions, and more highly-paid workers will receive a capped maximum 
though payroll taxes continue to be levied on salary up to high levels. It is therefore unlikely that evasion 
will decline substantially under the new Uruguayan system. 
  Also of concern is the system’s long-run ability to respond to business cycle and other shocks, 
and whether the new institutions envisioned by the Uruguayan social security reform will be successful.  
Current system revenues are too low to meet current expenditures, so some explicit mechanism to deal 
with this must be devised immediately. Otherwise there will be little incentive for workers to contribute to 
the AFAPs, and little reason for private AFAPs to be established. More generally, the 1995 law does not 
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satisfy the fundamental necessity of laying out precisely how various risks are to be borne by the 
stakeholders in the Uruguayan system including covered and uncovered employees, the reconfigurd 
public social security system, the regulated individual account system, the private insurance and annuity 
companies, and the state and future taxpayers more generally.  
  Similar questions have arisen in other nations undertaking capitalization efforts, notably in 
Argentina, where the public Banco de la Nacion guarantees a minimum real rate of return on 
investments in what are there called AFJPs (Associaciones de Fondos de Jubilacion y Pensiones) along 
with a state minimum public pension of 40% of average pay for anyone whose other pensions are 
inadequate (World Bank 1994a; Rofman 1993).  Without more clarity about financing of these return and 
benefit guarantees, it is almost impossible to ascertain the social security system’s financially 
vulnerability under poor economic circumstances. 
  A different area of concern has to do with some of the supplemental benefit plans 
offered under the new (as well as the old) system.  The BPS maintains total responsibility for, and 
monopoly control over, access to partial disability benefits, while AFAPs and private insurers are charged 
with handling total disability benefits.  From an insurance perspective, since both sponsors of disability 
plans are required to provide defined benefit payments,  it would behoove them t  predict and charge for 
the expected value of future payouts.  However there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding future 
takeup rates, implying that both parties’ future costs are difficult to forecast. In addition, under the law 
there are no earmarked payroll taxes for disability benefits, breaking the link between tax revenues and 
benefits owed.  Another concern is that when AFAP returns are low, workers would be expected to be 
more likely to seek disability plan eligibility.  For example this could occur during economic downturns as 
has been seen in the United States over the last decade (Stapleton and Livermore 1995).  Such 
undesirable  correlations would severely undermine both the public and the private AFAPs’ financial 
positions. 
B.  Benefit Amounts and Distributive Consequences of the Reform 
 On the benefits front, certain transitional matters must be handled right away, and others must 
be handled over the next decade. To begin with, the Uruguayan social security reform law distinguishes 
three cohorts of beneficiaries:  current retirees, employees over the age of 40, and workers currently 40 
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or younger.  It appears that no current retirees will be affected by any changes in the law [Art 61]. 
Workers over the age of 40 appear to have an option to stay in the old system, or within 180 days [Art 
65] may switch to the new system.  Those who do not opt into the new system may have their benefits 
computed according to the old rules, or the old rules with the new basic salary/minima/maxima instead, 
and benefits will be paid according to the higher formulas [Art 63].   
  Workers over the age of 40 opting into the reformed system face new age and service 
requirements for the basic retirement benefit which gradually become sex-neutral over time [Art 67-8].  
As now, men must be at least age 60, but women’s normal retirement age (which had been 55) rises to 
60 by the year 2003 (for both 35 years of service is required).  The requirements for very old age 
supplementary benefits also move into sex-neutrality.  As under the prior rules, under the new law men 
must attain age 70; women must attain that age by 2003 (rising from 66 now); both face an increase in 
years of service for that benefit of 11 years in 1977 rising to 15 years in 2003 and thereafter.  Regular 
retirement benefits appear to be computed according to the identical first pillar formula described above, 
though during the transition phase the gain for delayed retirement after age 60 in the minimum formula is 
only 4% rising to 12% per year over the decade to 2003 (compare eq. 2).  In general the lower returns to 
delayed retirement for the transition generation will probably not encourage continued work by much, 
particularly if many are at the minimum.  The minimum and maximum disability benefits are likewise 
scheduled to rise over time.  
  One datum as yet unknown is what fraction of the over-40 workforce will actually opt into the 
AFAP pillar. Only 13% of the Uruguayan workforce currently earns more than the $5,000 threshold, and 
the low-wage group will probably opt out of the AFAP private pillar (see above; also Gomez-Fabling 
1995:5). In addition, early evidence from Argentina indicates that many people are choosing to stay with 
the publicly run plan there, expecting to receive higher benefits than those ge erated by the private 
capitalization pillar in a wide range of economic circumstances (Rofman 1993). This is because the 
Argentine plan offers a combined first-pillar pension (the PBU) of about 30% of pay plus an additional 
30% via a  government second-pillar, which for many people will be higher than what the individual 
capitalization account generates from investing 11% of pay at a 2% real rate of return until retirement.  
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  Whether this pattern holds true in Uruguay will depend on the difference between th  rate of real 
earnings growth (which affects the base salary used in the public pillar benefits) and the real rate of 
return of private capitalization pension investments (which determines the growth of the AFAP accounts). 
A simulation analysis, while beyond the scope of the present paper, would be useful so as to better judge 
which series of circumstances would make a private AFAP contribution plus investment earnings worth 
more than the public defined benefit promise which rises with pay.  In any eve t it is not a sure thing that 
those Uruguayans given the option to contribute to the capitalization account will do so.  One recent 
analysis concluded that the entire Uruguayan AFAP system might receive no more than US$30-50 
million annually (Ayala 1995:8).  A different estimate predicted an AFAP accrual of 2.9% of GDP, rising 
to US $5.0 billion by the rear 2020. 
  For workers currently under the age of 40, the minimum and maximum benefits relevant to the 
first pillar and supplementary pensions are stepped up over time such that there is an increasing 
incentive to work beyond age 60.  For example, there is currently a delayed retirement credit for work 
over the age of 60 of 4%, which rises to 12% by the year 2003 (for a maximum of 10 years: Art 75).  
Similarly, minimum disability benefits rise by a specified amount over time to the year 2003. Widow/er 
benefits for survivors under age  40 are means tested and payable only for a specified period in the 
future (if age 30-5, 5 years; if under age 30, 2 years: At 25).  It appears that all of these nominal 
minima/maxima will be indexed over time [Art 12] so that the government’s benefit obligations are 
increasing over time.  Whether this was intended, and whether it is desirable, is in question, given the old 
social security system’s insolvency. 
 When looking at benefits, it is worth noting that the redistributiveness of the Uruguayan social 
security system may change in several ways. If payroll tax evasion is, in fact, curtailed, more people will 
pay into the quite redistributive public pillar that guarantees low-wage workers a minimum pension and 
limits high-earners’ benefits due to the cap. On the other hand, it is generally the case that low-wage 
workers have higher mortality rates than higher income employees, so that reducing evasion could 
increase rather than reduce net regressivity (World Bank 1994).  Extending the length of the period used 
to compute benefits also has a double-edged effect: on the one hand evasion should fall as a 
consequence, but on the other, lower-wage workers will have to work longer and pay more in taxes into 
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the system to receive the minimum benefit.  It may result that, on net, the new system will be less rather 
than more redistributive. 
 The redistributional effects of the new Uruguayan system will also depend on what effect the new 
rules have on retirement behavior and whether low-wage workers respond differentially than do high-
wage employees.  Almost all persons (except 70-year old men) face lower pension replacement rates 
and below for  retirement at age 60 (Table 2).  This would be expected to induce somewhat later 
retirement, but the effect might be expected to be larger among the low-paid who lack other sources of 
retirement income.  To the extent that the low-paid also die younger, smaller replacement rates reduce 
benefit payouts to lower earners more than proportionally.  Somewhat different patterns are evident by 
sex, as well.  Overall, women’s benefits are cut more than the men’s,  as compared to the current system 
(of course, on average).  To fully judge the likely effect of these changes in benefit patterns it would be 
necessary to know the current pattern of retirement ages by sex, age and years of service, and to 
simulate how they would change under the new law. Unfortunately these data are not currently available.   
 Another area deserving of additional attention as the reform process proceeds is in the area of 
the supplementary benefits. As has been demonstrated in many other countries, a disability pension has 
become a favorite “path to early retirement”, particularly if the medical and other criteria used to 
determine eligibility are relatively lax (Burkhauser 1993). Under the new Uruguayan law, disability 
benefits remain quite generous and in some cases greater than retirement benefits (65% of base salary 
for temporary disability, 45% for total disability).  It is possible that applications for these benefits will 
rise, as eligibility rules for regular retirement benefits are tightened.   
 A different distributional issue must be raised with regard to the differential benefit rules that 
continue to apply to teachers and certain other occupations (e.g. construction workers, those in risky 
occupations). On the whole these groups continue to receive more generous benefits than average under 
this revised system, which suggests that a certain regressivity still applies (World Bank 1988).  In 
addition, several large pension cajas such (those of professors, notaries, and bankers) still remain 
outside the BPS system.7 Certainly a common set of rules and benefit amounts would be more 
                                            
7 The military pension system is also slated to remain separate from the overhauled program. 
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egalitarian, though current law promises to respect the institutional and financial autonomy of these 
cajas. 
  Finally, it appears that system solvency will require further adjustments on social security ben fit 
payments in the relatively short term.  As Table 4 shows, Uruguayan demographic projections indicate 
that the burden of the elderly will rise considerably over the next 3-4 d cades.  In fact, Uruguay currently 
has the highest ratio of people over age 60 in the LAC region, and by the year 2030 it will have one-third 
more elderly than the LAC average.  In addition, the social security system’s early retirement ages, 
coupled with low national mortality rates, imply that Uruguayan men can expect to spend 16.7 years 
retired (and women 25 years) and receiving benefits.  These figures are substantially higher than in the 
US (14.9 and 18.6 years respectively), and in the OECD as a whole (15.2 and 18.6 years; World Bank 
1994b). 
  One way to improve system solvency is to raise the normal retirement age further, 
perhaps to age 65 or 70, and then index it thereafter to life expectancy.  The current retirement age 
would perhaps then be the earliest age at which a retiring worker could receive benefits, but benefits 
would be reduced actuarially from the (higher) regular retirement age.  In other words, if the early 
retirement benefit were cut to about half of the regular retirement age benefit, this would help move the 
system toward a better financial position.  
C. System Structure and Administration  
 One important factor influencing the potential appear of the new AFAP system is how cost-
effective the private capitalization AFAP firms will be.  Currently the BPS and other pension cajas 
expend 6% of annual outlays on administrative costs (Gomez-Fabling 1995), and efforts are underway to 
design a more cost-effective BPS agency.  Table 4 provides data on other public pension system 
administrative costs for comparison purposes.   In addition, the BPS is in the process of creating the new 
publicly-run AFAP. 
  A critical issue at this juncture is whether the newly-cr ated AFAPs will be large enough 
to be sustained at any level of economy.  Early estimates project that a maximum of 3% of employees’ 
payroll contributions will flow to the AFAPs (Gomez-Fabling 1995) during the early years.  Small AFAPs 
are likely to be extremely expensive to administer, based on studies of scale economies in pensions in 
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several different countries.  For example, in Chile, administration and marketing costs totaled one-
quarter of pension contributions in the early years of the program, though they have declined somewhat 
more recently (Diamond 1993; Diamond and Salvador Valdes Prieto 1994; Mitchell et al. 1994a, b; 
James and Palacios 1995).  
{Tables 6, 7} 
  There is no question that an administrative overhaul of the BPS system, combined with 
computerization and better record keeping and reporting, will help streamline costs and make the system 
more efficient. Simultaneously the BPS must develop workers’ covered employment histories, to 
establish benefit entitlements under the first pillar and the supplementary pension system.  Additional 
regulations will also be required regarding the form and structure of the private AFAPs, links between the 
AFAPs and the insurance sector, and conditions under which various governmental guarantees are 
payable.  For example, better record-keeping by a public pension agency can reduce benefit 
expenditures, inasmuch as without proper tracking of employment histories, retirees might receive 
benefits they might not be entitled to.  In addition, public social security systems can be further spurred 
into cost-saving by competitive pressures. As an example of this, the Chilean public pension system 
undertook a massive modernization effort toward the end of the 1980s, an effort that resulted in 
substantial agency cost cutting along with important increases in service quality (Reid and Mitchell 1995; 
Mandakovic 1994a, b).  
  Specific examples of service quality improvements that can be targeted appear in Table 8, and 
include turnaround time for posting employee and employer contributions, faster responses to requests 
for benefits, and better investment management of funds.  In particular, the possibility of international 
diversification of fund management should be contemplated, to protect retirees against political risk (e.g. 
inflation, a decline in national tax revenue).8 Of course, as has been noted in many other studies of 
social security administrative efficiency, cost-savings on the administrative front will not be sufficient to 
resolve the social system’s insolvency problems in the long run (Mitchell et al. 1994a and b; Reid and 
Mitchell 1995; James and Palacios 1995).  Nevertheless, such administrative cost-saving  along with 
higher quality consumer oriented services, would do a great deal to restore confidence in the system. 
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D. Market Efficiency Effects of the Uruguayan Social Security Reform 
 Based on this analysis of the Uruguayan law and its similarities and differences with systems in 
other countries, what can be said about the likely market efficiency effects of the Uruguayan social 
security reform?  First, with regard to capital markets, it appears that the new Uruguayan plan will 
probably not generate massive new incentives to save through the capitalization system.  Unfortunately, 
without substantial new capitalization it is unlikely that Uruguay will experience the degree of capital 
market deepening and broadening that Chile’s AFPs have been credited with generating (Wo ld Bank 
1994b). To improve capital market functioning via social security reform, it will be necessary to increase 
the fraction of the payroll tax channeled to the AFAPs.  In addition, it would be helpful to curtail the 
restrictive investment limits on AFAP portfolios, and to free the AFAPs from having to offer defined 
benefit-type payments.  This can be achieved only by imposing further benefit cuts on the first-pillar 
system.  
 Second, with regard to labor markets, the new Uruguayan plan may slightly encourage delayed 
retirement, but on net this effect will be modest.  In addition, there remain real concerns about evasion, 
particularly among low-wage earnings likely to receive the minimum pension, and also among higher-
paid who perceive no benefit from additional payroll taxes under the first pillar.  The fact that overall 
payroll taxes have not been cut from their very high rates depresses the demand for labor relative to 
capital in Uruguay, and in addition would be expected to depress wages as has been demonstrated in 
Chile (Gruber 1995).  A smaller first-pillar system, paying replacement rates on the order of 25-30%, 
would have fewer of these negative effects on the labor market. Of course, social security benefits at 
such a low level would necessitate continued work for more people of limited means.  
E. What Remains To Be Done 
 Several additional questions remain to be answered before the evolving Uruguayan social 
security reform plan can be said to be complete.   
1. Should Uruguay enhance first-pillar benefit uniformity? 
 For equity reasons, as noted above, it would be useful to further enhance retirement system 
uniformity across all occupational categories in the country.  Bringing benefits and eligibility ages into 
                                                                                                                                            
8 See Fields and Mitchell (1995) regarding the risks social security systems face.  
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conformity would also lower administrative costs.   In addition, covering all employees with the same 
retirement system would make portability of benefit accruals easier, hence encourage worker mobility 
across jobs.  This may be a useful development as the economy strives to become more competitive, 
though there will no doubt be political issues raised in such a transition.   
2. Should Uruguay modify the first-pillar floor and ceiling benefits? 
 Some observers have suggested that it would be useful to modify or eliminate the benefit floors 
and ceilings specified in the new Uruguayan social security reform law.  The floor is the minimum benefit 
payable to a retired worker with the requisite years of service but who had very low earnings levels 
recorded by the system.  Eliminating the guaranteed social security minimum benefit is useful along two 
dimensions:  it makes the program less expensive, and it increases incentives for people to contribute to 
the system (those who evade their contributions will receive lower benefits in retirement).  On the o her 
hand, eliminating the minimum social security pension generates very low benefits for some people even 
though they contributed to the system 35 years (at age 60) or 15 years (at age 70).  So from a 
redistributive vantage point, eliminating the minimum is undesirable. 
 Another concern is that the current system still embodies incentives for evasion.  To illustrate the 
point, let us posit a low-wage worker who  has contributed the necessary years and in his 35th year of 
service earns a marginal $1.  Since employer taxes are fully shifted to the employee (Gruber 1995), the 
marginal $1 of earnings is taxed at 27.5% if the worker reports it to the social security system.  Very low-
paid workers would always receive the minimum or floor benefit, so that no additional benefits would flow 
from the additional tax.  Clearly, the higher the social security minimum benefit, the greater the 
regressivity of the payroll tax, and the stronger the incentive for low-paid workers to evade contributing to 
the system. 
 Having a maximum benefit payable under the social security system also produces some 
incentives for evasion, though again the decision of where to set the maximum must weigh costs versus 
benefits.  Naturally, capping the benefit paid by the first pillar hel s reduce system costs, and helps 
ensure that available benefits are targeted more effectively to the lifetime-low-wage earners.  However 
the existence of the maximum implies that high wage-earners will perceive that their first pillar benefits 
stop rising after some point but contributions continue.  Of course the second pillar program does reward 
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high earners to the extent they report their earnings, raising their capitalization amount without a 
maximum.  Since the maximum benefit appears to be quite high -- payable to those whose 10-year 
average pay is $8,600/month--keeping the maximum is probably politically sensible and is not likely to 
drastically alter high-paid workers’ incentives to contribute at the margin.  
 A related task for the Uruguayan social security system as it moves forward is to bring into line 
the minimums and maximums under both the regular retirement and the disability plans.  Currently, the 
minimum disability benefit is much higher than the minimum regular retirement benefit.   Lowering he 
minimum disability benefit to the minimum payable under the regular retirement benefit program has the 
beneficial effect of curtailing incentives to “game” the system.  Similarly, reducing the maximum pension 
payable under regular retirement to the maximum level offered under the disability plan would save 
money and reduce incentives to switch across plans at different ages.  In general, however, lowering the 
average benefit formula would do more to restore system solvency and increase work incentives, than 
would realigning the minimums and maximums. 
3. Should Uruguay introduce Recognition Bonds? 
 Current active workers have accrued social security benefit obligations in the old Uruguayan 
system, based on past service and earnings.  When Chile and Peru terminated their old unfunded social 
security systems, they made explicit the past service obligations by offering so-called Recognition 
Bonds.  Active workers are required to hold these until retirement, at which time they present them to the 
government in order to claim an annuity based on the bono amount (plus some rate of return set by the 
government).  In Peru the bonos were frozen in nominal terms, and in Chile the promised amount was 
decreased when the bonos were computed (World Bank 1994b).  As a result, in both these cases, the 
recognition bond mechanism effectively reduced the government’s implicit debt while converting it to an 
explicit debt.   
 Whether Recognition Bonds would be advisable for Uruguay, as it seeks to reform its social 
security system, depends on how the bonds would be structured, and who would hold them.  Moving to 
this sort of bond would not resolve the system’s solvency problem if the bonos promised indexed benefits 
under the old social security benefit formula.  In fact, having such bonds might make it more rather than 
less difficult for the government to reduce promise benefits offered under the old regime, since the old-
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system obligations would be made explicit and formalized.  Also, the current social security reform law 
does not explicitly incorporate these bonds as part of the Uruguayan reform law, so that moving in this 
direction would probably require new legislation.  Clearly the political and economic costs of issuing 
Recognition Bonds must be deemed less than the ben fits, in order to consider moving ahead on this 
front. 
4. Should Uruguay increase AFAP competitiveness? 
 One of the realities of moving to a defined contribution pension system is that pension 
participants now must bear capital market risk in a way they did not under the old defined benefit social 
security system.  On the other hand, participants also stand to reap higher investment rewards if they 
make good investment decisions.   
 As currently structured, the Uruguayan social security reform law seems to offer only limited 
possibilities for substantial rewards under the AFAP system.  Among the restrictions imposed by the 
government are a prohibition against investing in more than one AFAP at a time: the requirement that 
real returns on AFAP investments may not fall below 2% per year; and a rule that individual AFAPs may 
not earn less than 2% below the average of all AFAPs.  More critical still is the mandate that all AFAPs 
must invest 100% in government bonds initially, and 60% in the long run; the regulation that investment 
company as well as insurance company investments are disallowed; and the prohibition against foreign 
investments. Increasing investor diversification and better protection against macroeconomic risks would 
be achieved by diversifying pension holdings as soon as possible (Fields and Mitchell 1995), though this 
may require a change in the pension law to permit international diversification.  Such gains would be 
enhanced by additional systematic reporting and disclosure efforts describing to plan participants how 
benefits are linked to accruals, how the investments are performing, and what administrative costs are. 
5. How should Uruguay manage AFAP retirement payouts? 
 As yet Uruguayan legislation has not devoted a great deal of attention to issues surrounding 
payouts under the AFAP system when workers reach retirement age. It will be recalled that at retirement, 
the AFAP participant must purchase an annuity from an insurance company, but there is no law 
prohibiting selective annuity pricing based on anticipated longevity.  Thus for instance women and 
healthy retirees of both sexes would be expected to be charged more, or would receive lower annuities, 
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reflecting their lower anticipated mortality rates. Differential annuity pricing in this way may be expected 
to have incentive effects in terms of these groups’ willingness to contribute to the system, and will 
certainly affect retiree well-b ing.   
 Another as-yet-unsettled policy issue regarding the form of benefit payouts is whether the 
government will permit AFAP accumulations to be cashed out in lump sum form at retirement.  As 
currently written the law does not appear to permit such an option, but there will certainly be pressure to 
permit it as accumulations begin to mount.  In Chile, the government allows retirees to obtain partial 
lump-sum cashouts as long as the remaining accumulation is sufficient to fund the purchase of a 
minimum government pension. Permitting lump sum cash outs in Uruguay would have the clear 
advantage of reducing ince tives for evasion, while also increasing investor support for the AFAP 
system.  On the other hand, lump sum cash outs could seriously erode the insurance pool over which the 
annuities were written, and might threaten the role of insurance companies in the plan al ogether. 
IV. Conclusions 
 Without summarizing all the issues developed in this discussion to this point, several points are 
worth reiterating.  The most positive aspect of the Uruguayan reform from the point of view of the 
survival of social security in that nation is that benefit promises will grow less quickly under the new 
rules, than they would have under the old system. At the same time, a minimum pension is to be 
maintained in real terms, providing a floor under retiree income.  In addition, the proposed  institutional 
reforms of the BPS will facilitate monitoring of taxes collected, better cost-accounting and record-
keeping, and more accurate tracking of funds for individual programs within the agency’s purview.  All of 
these developments are positive steps on the way to a reformed, and more solvent system. 
 Remaining concerns must also be acknowledged.  The new Uruguayan plan is complex, more so 
than the system recently passed in Argentina.  This lack of transparency will inevitably undermine 
support for both the public and the private pillars.  In addition there remain many opportunities and 
incentives for evasion, which persists strongly under the new system. 
  Perhaps most importantly, the plan as presently structured does not appear to be solvent over 
the medium and long run.  This is troubling inasmuch as Uruguayan payroll tax rates are still extremely 
high, making labor costs among the most expensive in Latin America.  Social security payroll tax rates 
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could be reduced by raising the retirement age further and under some circumstances by paring benefits 
further.  Additional reforms to confront the solvency problem directly must receive highest priority to 
ensure economic stability and political support for the system.  Finally, it is not clear tha  strong private 
Uruguayan AFAPs will develop quickly after the initial government- un plan organized by the BPS is 
established.  More work needs to be done to ensure that private alternatives to the government-run plan 
are viable and that workers opt to move into them for the relevant portion of their contributions.  Better 
reporting and tracking of funds and administrative costs within the AFAPS is required, between the 
AFAPS and the BPS, and between the AFAPs and the insurance companies. In general, a regulatory 
structure should be put in place that encourages private sector groups to take over part of the old public 
system's money management and insurance roles, and to deliver more secure benefits than the old 
system could reasonably promise. 
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Table 1. Social Security Expenditures As a % of GDP 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Latin America and the Caribbean  OECD 
Mean 3.30 Mean 19.26 
Standard dev. 3.25 Standard dev. 7.79 
________________________________ __________________________________________  
Antigua-Barbuda n/a Australia 9.18 
Argentina 6.10 Austria 25.38 
Bahamas 1.43 Belgium 26.39 
Barbados 4.89 Canada 16.23 
Belize 0.56 Denmark 26.27 
Bolivia 1.91 Finland 22.80 
Brazil 4.98 France 26.80 
Chile 13.10 Germany 23.40 
Colombia 2.00 Greece 19.48 
Costa Rica 7.30 Iceland 7.23 
Cuba n/a Ireland 23.20 
Dominica 1.42 Italy 11.18 
Dominican Republic 0.47 Japan 12.16 
Ecuador 3.01 Luxembourg 23.42 
El Salvador 1.07 Netherlands 28.56 
Grenada 1.72 New Zealand 17.86 
Guatemala 0.85 Norway 29.78 
Guyana 2.80 Portugal 10.39 
Haiti n/a Spain 18.14 
Honduras 1.02 Sweden 31.33 
Jamaica 1.29 Switzerland 14.67 
Mexico 2.67 Turkey 3.62 
Nicaragua n/a United Kingdom 20.35 
Panama 8.28 United States 12.55 
Paraguay n/a   
Peru 1.61   
St Lucia 0.79   
St Vincent n/a   
Surinam n/a   
Trinidad and Tobago 2.22   
Uruguay 9.61   
Venezuela 1.29   
___________________________________________________________________________  
Source:  Mitchell et al. (1994b) 
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Table 2. Wage Replacement Rates of Old-Age Social Security in Uruguay: 
Pre and Post 1995 Reforms 
 
 
        Benefits as % of 
    pensionable base earnings 
          Years of Earnings 
     35  40   
I. At 60 years of age 
Men: Old system    65%  70% 
Women: Old system   70  75 
 
Both:  New system   50  52.5 
 
II. At 65 years of age 
Men: Old system    65%  70% 
Women: Old system   80  80 
 
Both:  New system   60  65 
 
III. At 70 years of age 
Men: Old system    67.5%  75% 
Women: Old system   77.5  80 
 
Both:  New system   70  75 
          
Source: IADB (1996). 
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Table 3. Social Security Administrative Costs as a % of Benefit Expenditures 
_______________________________________________________________________________  
Latin America and the Caribbean  OECD 
Mean  27.78  Mean  3.12  
Standard deviation  31.16  Standard deviation  1.28  
_______________________________________________________________________________  
 
Antigua-Barbuda  n/a  Australia  1.22  
Argentina  2.30  Austria  2.48  
Bahamas  30.75  Belgium  4.55  
Barbados  5.56  Canada  2.80  
Belize  89.49  Denmark  2.98  
Bolivia  21.39  Finland  3.36  
Brazil  7.00  France  4.18  
Chile  8.00  Germany  2.86  
Colombia  81.80  Greece  6.72  
Costa Rica  4.75  Iceland  1.71  
Cuba  n/a  Ireland  4.88  
Dominica  46.97  Italy  2.20  
Dominican Rep.  31.72  Japan  1.79  
Ecuador  13.55  Luxembourg  2.74  
El Salvador  33.40  Netherlands  3.10  
Grenada  9.85  New Zealand  2.42  
Guatemala  12.72  Norway  1.00  
Guyana  22.66  Portugal  4.86  
Haiti  n/a  Spain  2.81  
Honduras  18.25  Sweden  4.24  
Jamaica  6.40  Switzerland  3.04  
Mexico  23.55  Turkey  2.62  
Nicaragua  n/a  United Kingdom  3.10 
Panama  5.88  United States  3.28  
Paraguay  n/a      
Peru  130.98      
St. Lucia  48.31      
St. Vincent  n/a      
Surinam  n/a      
Trinidad & Tobago  15.29      
Uruguay  6.51      
Venezuela  17.46      
_______________________________________________________________________________  
Source: Mitchell et al. (1994b) 
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Table 4. Comparative Statistics on Latin American Demography and Retirement Systems 
              
           Country or Region 
 
    Uruguay Argentina       Chile          LAC OECD   
 
Demographic Data  
Population > 60 1/ 16.4% 13.1 8.7 8.2 18.6 
Population > 65 1/ 11.4  9.0        5.9 4.6 13.6 
Population > 75 1/   4.4  3.2  2.1 1.5  5.9 
Pop.>60/Pop.20-59 1/  33.3 26.9       17.0      18.0 34.0 
Pop.>65/Pop.15-64 1//  18.2 14.8        9.3       9.5 19.6 
Proj.%>60 by 2000 2/    22.5 19.3       20.8      16.0 27.7 
____________________________________________________________________________________  
 
National Retirement System Coverage and Financing 
SS Contrib./LF 3/ 68.8% 53.2 62.2 38.3 93.9 
Pensions/Pop>60 3/ 81.7 72.4 na  30.8 84.1 
Pensioners/Contribs3/  47.6 66.7 na  21.0 39.2 
 
Ret.Spend./GDP4/  8.8 4.6 na   2.0  9.2 
Ret.Taxes/GDP5/  6.4 5.1 na   2.4  9.1 
Tot. Payroll tax  
 rate6/  ~29% 21 13.3 10.5  16.3 
Components of Retirement System Revenues 6/   
 Payroll tax 92.0% 74.0 na  63.8 57.4 
 Invest. earns   1.1  0.0 na 23.0 11.0 
 Gen. revenues    6.9 26.0 na 13.0 35.1 
_______________________________________________________________________________ _____  
 
National Retirement System Benefit Rules 
Covered Yrs Serv.6/ 35 yrs 15 20  13.9 18.3 
Ret. Age (M/F)6/             60/60            60/55        65/60  61/59 64/63 
Ben.Repl@30yrs7/     50%*      70  na na na 
Exp. Duration of 
 Ret, (M/F)8/        16.7/25.0**     15.6/24.1           na na          15.2/18.6 
____________________________________________________________________________________  
  
Notes: 
*At 35 years of service 
**Under old system rules (men retire @ 60 and women @ 55).
Sources: 
1. World Bank 1994: T. A1. 
2. World Bank 1994: T. A2. 
3. World Bank 1994: T. A4. 
4. World Bank 1994: T. A5. 
5. World Bank 1994: T. A6. 
6. World Bank 1994: T. A7. 
7. World Bank 1994: T. A8. 
8. World Bank 1994: T. A10. 
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Table 5.  Medium-Term Forecasts of Social Security System in Uruguay 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________  
          Percent of GDP 
   1995  2005  2015  2025  2035   
I. Old system 
BPS Expenditures 14.8%  15.3  15.7  16.2  16.8 
Pensions  11.3  11.5  11.8  12.0  12.3 
Other benefits   2.6   2.8   2.9   3.1   3.3 
Other expenditures  0.9   1.0   1.0   1.1   1.2 
 
BPS Revenues   8.3%   8.3   8.3   8.3   8.3   
Private sector   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7 
Other excl. Treas.  0.6   0.6   0.6   0.6   0.6 
 
Transfers from  
 Treasury  6.5   7.0   7.4   7.9   8.6   
 
II. New system 
BPS Expenditures 14.8%  12.4  11.5  10.8  10.0 
Pensions  11.3   9.6   8.9   8.2   7.4 
Other benefits   2.6   2.2   2.0   2.0   2.0 
Other expenditures  0.9   0.8   0.6   0.6   0.6 
 
BPS Revenues   8.3%   8.3   8.1   8.1   8.1   
Private sector   7.7   7.7   7.5   7.5   7.5 
Other excl. Treas.  0.6   0.6   0.6   0.6   0.6 
 
Transfers from 
 Treasury  6.5   4.3   3.4   2.7   1.0 
              
Source: IMF (1995). 
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Table 6. Social Security Administrative Costs in Selected Countries  
 
 CHILE COSTA RICA ARGENTINA U.S. 
 
 
 
Year 
AFP 
Admin. 
Charges/ 
Contribs. (1) 
INP 
Admin. Costs / 
Benefits (2) 
CCSS 
Admin. Costs / 
Benefits (3) 
ANSES Costs/Benefits (4) 
w/o including 
Collection costs 
SSA (5) 
 
Cost/Benefit: 
OASI  Disability 
1980      1.1% 2.0% 
1981        
1982        
1983        
1984        
1985    1.7%  0.9% 2.8% 
1986    1.8%    
1987 25%   2.7% 5.3%   
1988 24%   2.2% 4.1%   
1989 20%   2.3% 5.5%   
1990 18% 1.1%  3.3% 5.6% 0.7% 2.4% 
1991  1.3%  2.7% 5.1% 0.7% 2.4% 
1992 17% 1.6% 5.1% 4.7% 7.4%   
1993  1.9%      
 
 
Source: Reid and Mitchell (1995) 
Note:  Data in this table reflect only pension-related social security functions. 
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Table 7. Social Security Administrative Costs Per Participant, Selected Countries (constant 1992 
US$) 
 
CHILE              COSTA RICA                  ARGENTINA 
 AFP INP CCSS ANSES Cost/Member (5) 
 
Year 
/ Active 
Contributor 
(1) 
/Contri-
butor(2) 
/ Plan 
Member(3) 
/ Plan 
Member(4) 
w/out including 
Collection costs 
1980        
1981        
1982  $71.0 $44.7     
1983  $55.0 $35.8     
1984  $50.0 $29.5     
1985  $43.0 $24.9   $  6.7  
1986  $42.0 $24.2   $  8.9  
1987  $39.0 $22.6   $11.0 $21.5 
1988  $44.0 $24.5   $  8.5 $15.7 
1989  $42.0 $23.2   $  5.4 $12.9 
1990  $45.0 $31.8   $16.8 $28.4 
1991  $46.0 $27.8 $44.2  $20.7 $39.1 
1992 $51.6 $49.0 $29.8 $47.7 $7.6 $46.0 $72.6 
1993    $40.8  $39.2 $65.2 
 
 
Source: Reid and Mitchell (1995) 
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 Table 8. Social Security System Performance Indicators, Selected Countries  
 
Performance Indicator, Country, System and Measure 
 
Performance 
Contributions Administration Performance  
CHILE  
AFP  
% of accounts correctly credited in 1 mo of   payment 6.20% 
Correctly credited contributions (incidence of rezagos)   
1991 1.05% 
1992 0.78% 
1993 0.83% 
% of active accounts receiving statement every 4 months low 
% of accounts receiving statement every 12 months   low 
INP NA 
 
COSTA RICA  
CCSS (1994) NA 
 
ARGENTINA  
ANSES (1993) NA 
 
USA    
SSA:  (1991)  
Posting accuracy to Summary Earnings Record 0.8% 
Records posted within 6 months of close of tax year 30.0% 
 
Benefits Administration Performance  
CHILE  
AFP (1993)  
Benefit determination correct   27.0% 
INP NA 
 
COSTA RICA   
CCSS (1994)  
% of old age pensioners disputing initial benefit determination 20-50% 
% of invalidity cases disputing initial eligibility determination 33%-50% 
% of invalidity determinations overturned on court appeal 25%-40% 
 
ARGENTINA  
ANSES (1993) (3)  
% of benefit determinations appealed to courts 29.7% 
 
USA (4)  
SSA:  OASI (1991)  
Correct initial payments 5.2% 
Correct lifetime claims payments 0.2% 
SSA:  Disability (1991)  
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Table 8 (continued)  
 
Client Inquiry Services Delivery Performance  
  
CHILE  
AFP NA 
INP NA 
  
COSTA RICA  
CCSS (1994) NA 
  
ARGENTINA  
ANSES (1993) NA 
  
USA (4)  
SSA:  (1991)  
Waiting time for client inquiries <15 mins. w/appt. 12.4% 
Waiting time for client inquiries <30 min. w/out appt. 17.7% 
Waiting time for client inquiries <60 min. 4.7% 
Telephone inquiries answered w/in 24 hrs. 8.0% 
Information provided leads to correct payment 2.7% 
 
 
 
Source: Reid and Mitchell (1995)  
Note: Rezagos are contributions that do not match the contributors' data base for 
a given AFP. 
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